A Walker Blue white paper
By Josh Howes, CEO, Walker Blue LLC
1. Executive Summary
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal in Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C, et al. v. United States on October 7, 2026, ending a dispute that began in 2013.1 The dismissal leaves intact the Court of Federal Claims’ July 8, 2026 trial opinion2 and its July 27, 2026 judgment awarding the taxpayers $49,407,203.33 in additional Section 1603 cash grants plus applicable interest.3 The dismissal does not make the trial court’s valuation methodology binding precedent, but it leaves standing one of the most detailed judicial analyses to date of developer profit, development costs, turn-key value, and the valuation of eligible renewable-energy property.
The July 2026 trial opinion is already being characterized as a victory for cost-based renewable-energy valuation and a rejection of purchase-price or income-based valuation. That description is directionally understandable but legally incomplete. The court did not hold that eligible basis can never exceed documented construction cost, that discounted-cash-flow valuation is impermissible or inherently defective,4 or that development profit and indirect costs must be excluded. It found that the taxpayers failed to produce sufficient asset-specific market evidence to support a DCF model that assigned approximately 98 percent of the anticipated Section 1603 cash grant to grant-eligible tangible property. The clearest proof that this is not a construction-cost cap is that the court added a developer profit of 15 percent for Alta I and 20 percent for Alta II through VI on top of documented cost.5
The court adopted a modified cost approach grounded in the contemporaneous KPMG cost-segregation reports. It excluded a broadly described category of development rights but included interest during construction, a documented development fee, and market-supported developer profit. The court selected the developer-profit percentages from project-specific ranges reflected in the DAI appraisals, and testimony showed that Citibank used DAI’s work in evaluating its acquisitions of Alta II through V.6 It denied a separate turn-key premium because the KPMG cost base already reflected amounts paid under contracts requiring the delivery, assembly, testing, commissioning, and integration of operational facilities, and the taxpayers did not establish an additional increment of turn-key value that was not already embedded in those costs. The resulting opinion is therefore less a command to use cost only than a demand for disciplined classification, capitalization, allocation, and evidentiary support.
For current Sections 48 and 48E projects, Alta Wind is most consequential when a taxpayer acquires a completed or development-stage project for substantially more than its documented construction costs. In those transactions a cost-basis study must do more than identify qualifying equipment. It must address how the acquisition price is allocated between tangible energy property and PPAs, development rights, permits, interconnection rights, goodwill, and other intangible value. Any claimed developer profit, development fee, or turn-key increment must be supported by the functions performed, the risks borne, the governing contracts, and contemporaneous market evidence.
Walker Blue is responding by strengthening, not abandoning, its engineering-led cost-basis process. Our post-Alta Wind methodology begins with the project’s transaction structure, traces costs to the physical property and development activities they produced, separates direct and indirect costs from identifiable intangibles, and reconciles the resulting eligible-basis position to the taxpayer’s contracts, accounting records, transaction documents, and other tax representations. For acquired projects and material basis step-ups, that work will include a more explicit Section 1060 and fair-market-value overlay, coordinated with the taxpayer’s CPA, counsel, and valuation professionals.
The durable lesson of Alta Wind is that eligible basis must be built, not merely asserted. The most defensible position will ordinarily be the one supported contemporaneously by engineering facts, itemized costs, contractual risk allocation, consistent tax reporting, and credible market evidence. That is precisely the record Walker Blue’s cost-basis studies are designed to develop.
One threshold point frames everything that follows. The 2026 decision remains a trial-court decision and is not binding precedent for other taxpayers. The Federal Circuit’s October 7 dismissal was entered because the parties agreed to it, and it is nonprecedential. It did not affirm or otherwise endorse the trial court’s valuation methodology. The Federal Circuit’s 2018 holding that the Alta Wind transactions were applicable asset acquisitions subject to Section 1060 remains precedential.7 The importance of the 2026 decision is therefore practical and persuasive. Its detailed treatment of cost segregation, development costs, developer profit, turn-key value, and valuation evidence now stands as the final disposition of the dispute, and Walker Blue expects the IRS, tax equity investors, credit buyers, appraisers, and insurers to consider it in future basis reviews.
2. Background and Procedural History
Section 1603 was a crisis-era program. The financial collapse of 2008 sharply contracted the tax-equity market, and developers without sufficient tax liability could not efficiently monetize the existing renewable-energy credits. Congress responded by allowing eligible owners to receive cash payments in lieu of the credits.8 The program restored liquidity, attracted private capital, and helped projects proceed at a time when conventional financing and tax-equity investment were severely constrained.
Section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allowed an eligible owner or lessee to receive a cash payment in lieu of the investment tax credit, with the amount generally determined using the same basis principles that govern the credit under Sections 48 and 48E today.9 That shared basis machinery is why a wind case from the 2009 grant era speaks directly to solar, storage, geothermal, and other technology basis questions in 2026. It also explains the shape of the dispute. A program built to move capital quickly during an emergency produced basis positions that were litigated for more than a decade afterward, and the evidentiary standards the court applied in 2026 are being read back onto documentation assembled in 2010.
The projects at issue are six wind facilities in the Tehachapi region of California, Alta I through Alta VI. Oak Creek Energy Systems and Allco Wind Energy Management completed the pre-construction development. In 2008 Terra-Gen Power acquired Allco’s U.S. wind energy business, bought out both Allco and Oak Creek, and then completed development and construction and took over the power purchase agreements with Southern California Edison. Terra-Gen’s total investment in the Alta Wind facilities was roughly $2.3 billion, with the buyout representing less than ten percent of that cost.10
Terra-Gen could not claim the grant itself. The statute barred pass-through entities from the grant where any equity or profits interest holder was tax-exempt, and Terra-Gen carried tax-exempt ownership.11 So between 2010 and 2012 Terra-Gen sold the completed facilities to grant-eligible owners through five sale-leasebacks and one outright sale. The buyers placed the facilities in service and applied for more than $703 million in grants, computed on an unallocated basis that treated essentially the full purchase price as eligible. Treasury rejected that method and paid roughly $495 million, derived primarily from Terra-Gen’s underlying construction and development costs.
The buyers sued in 2013 for the roughly $206 million difference, and the government counterclaimed for an alleged overpayment of about $58.9 million. The Court of Federal Claims awarded the taxpayers the full amount in 2016.12 In 2018 the Federal Circuit vacated in Alta Wind I Owner Lessor v. United States, 897 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018), holding that the acquisitions were applicable asset acquisitions under Section 1060 and that the purchase price had to be allocated across the asset classes using the residual method.13 The grant-eligible tangible property at issue fell within Class V. Section 197 intangibles other than goodwill and going-concern value fell within Class VI, while goodwill and going-concern value fell within Class VII. The Federal Circuit remanded for a factual allocation of the purchase price that distinguished turn-key value attributable to the tangible facilities from goodwill and other intangibles. After a retrial in 2025, Judge Ryan T. Holte issued the trial order on July 8, 2026.14
The historical figures above describe the dispute as it stood in the original proceedings, which involved a smaller group of plaintiffs. Two additional Alta I owner-lessors later joined the case, so the final accounting covers all four Alta I owner-lessors along with the owner-lessors of Alta II through V and Mustang Hills, LLC for Alta VI. On the parties’ joint status report, the fair market value of the eligible tangible property across all six facilities was approximately $2.014 billion, which produced a computed grant of $604,283,355.33 at thirty percent. Treasury had previously paid $554,876,152.00 to the full group. The court awarded the $49,407,203.33 difference on July 27, 2026, plus interest to the extent required by law and reasonable costs. The government appealed on October 1, 2026, and the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal on October 7, 2026, on the parties’ agreement, issuing the dismissal as its mandate and ending the litigation.15
3. The Competing Valuation Approaches
The retrial came down to a single methodological fight. The taxpayers valued the eligible property with an income approach. They argued that integrated, income-producing wind farms are best measured by the net cash they are expected to generate, discounted to present value, and their DCF model pulled the anticipated cash grant into the revenue stream. The government valued the same property with a replacement-cost approach, arguing that standard manufactured turbines, foundations, and balance-of-plant equipment are readily reproducible and should be valued at what it costs to build them plus a reasonable return to represent developer profit.
The gap between the two was enormous. Under its updated DCF the taxpayers claimed additional grants of roughly $191 million to $206 million. Under its cost approach the government claimed Treasury had overpaid the Section 1603 grant by roughly $58.9 million. The court’s task was not to crown a favorite methodology in the abstract but to decide which one, on this record, reliably isolated the fair market value of the Class V tangible assets that Section 1603 actually reaches.
4. The Court’s Modified Cost Approach
The court adopted the government’s cost approach as the more reliable framework on this record, then corrected it in the taxpayers’ favor on several inputs. It directed the parties to compute eligible basis through a defined sequence.
Start with the eligible cost figures recorded in the KPMG cost-segregation reports submitted to Treasury for each facility. Exclude the Development Rights category across the projects. Include and capitalize the interest during construction and the Oak Creek Development Fee as capitalizable indirect costs. Apply the grant-eligibility ratios reflected in the KPMG reports to separate eligible from ineligible assets within Class V, in which the grant-eligible tangible property at issue was classified. Apply no independent turn-key premium. Then apply developer profit of 15 percent for Alta I and 20 percent for Alta II through VI.
Two features of this structure matter as much as the steps themselves. The KPMG cost-segregation reports became the evidentiary anchor for the tangible-property calculation because KPMG devoted more than 1,000 hours to the work, reviewed the key agreements and supporting disbursements, conducted site visits, and ultimately concluded that Terra-Gen’s assertions of eligible costs were reasonably stated.16 And the profit markup sits on top of a fully built cost base, which is the concrete refutation of any reading that treats the opinion as a bare-construction-cost ceiling.
The final judgment illustrates the point. The taxpayers did not recover the roughly $206 million sought by the original plaintiffs under their DCF theory, and the government’s cost approach was not adopted as presented. The court adopted that approach with corrections for interest during construction, the Oak Creek Development Fee, and developer profit, and the result was an additional award of $49,407,203.33 plus interest to the full group of plaintiffs.
5. What the Court Included and Excluded
The most instructive part of the opinion is the contrast among similar development-related amounts, because inclusion turned on what each amount represented, how it was documented, whether it was capitalizable, and how it was allocated between eligible and ineligible property.
Interest during construction was included. The government characterized it as a return to the lender paid out of project profit. The court rejected that, reasoning that interest is profit to the bank rather than to the developer, that it is an actual out-of-pocket expense incurred to build the physical facility, and that Section 263A(f) requires capitalization of construction-period interest for long-lived property.17 It drew on longstanding Court of Claims precedent that reproduction cost would have included construction interest.
The Oak Creek Development Fee was included as a real development cost. The fee originated in the pre-construction development arrangement that Terra-Gen inherited when it bought out the original developers, and after the buyout it was payable through Alta Innovative Power Company, the development venture then co-owned by Terra-Gen and Oak Creek, giving the payment partial related-party character. Terra-Gen’s tax director treated it as an indirect cost and allocated it pro rata between eligible and ineligible property, making it partially grant-eligible. The government’s expert sought to strip it out, characterizing it as a success fee for developing intangible assets with nothing to do with the eligible property. The court disagreed and restored it as a cost the government had improperly excluded. The practical lesson for sponsors is that a development fee tied to real, documented work and reliably allocated between eligible and ineligible property may support inclusion in the fair market value of eligible Class V property. Neither the development fee label nor the partial related-party character of the payment was dispositive. The court examined the economic cost, the activities performed, and the supporting allocation.18
The Development Rights were excluded. The court’s directive removes the Development Rights category from the cost base. The consistent thread in the record is that Development Rights bundled together items of mixed character, some plausibly capitalizable and some intangible, drawn from the appraisal Terra-Gen used to separate the Allco purchase. The practical lesson is the mirror image of the fee. A cost category tied to documented work and cleanly allocated tends to survive, while a bundled category the taxpayer cannot break down is vulnerable in full. Granularity is what separated the two.
No independent turn-key premium was allowed, but turn-key value was not rejected. The court found that the KPMG cost base already included amounts paid under turbine-supply and balance-of-plant agreements requiring the delivery, assembly, testing, and integration of operational facilities. The taxpayers did not establish that an additional 15 percent premium represented incremental value not already embedded in those costs. Turn-key value remains a recognized component of Class V property, but the taxpayer must identify the residual integration or completion risk and demonstrate that the claimed increment has not already been paid for through the project contracts. The court also provided helpful guidance on what distinguishes turn-key value from goodwill and going-concern value, describing it as the incremental value a buyer would pay for assurance that the plant and equipment would all work together without need of costly and time-consuming adjustments and coordination.19
Developer profit was allowed. The government’s expert derived a roughly 9 percent return using the capital asset pricing model, producing about $41 million of profit on Alta I. The court did not adopt that figure. The court relied on the project-specific developer-profit ranges in the DAI appraisals, which placed developer profit at 10 to 15 percent for Alta I, 15 to 30 percent for Alta II through V, and 20 percent for Alta VI. Testimony showed that Citibank used DAI’s work in evaluating its acquisitions of Alta II through V and considered the appraisal conclusions consistent with its own fair-market-value analysis. The court found those market-reflective appraisal ranges more persuasive than the government expert’s CAPM-derived return and selected 15 percent for Alta I and 20 percent for Alta II through VI. These were project-specific factual findings, not renewable-energy safe harbors.20
One further evidentiary point is worth flagging because it recurs in Section 48E diligence. The government introduced wind turbine pricing index data showing that turbine prices fell during the period the cash grant program was active, and it argued that incentive-driven demand therefore did not raise the fair market value of the equipment. Turbines are a globally traded, price-indexed product, and that fact cut against treating the grant as a pure uplift to tangible value.
6. What Alta Wind Does Not Hold
Because the early commentary overstates the ruling in predictable ways, the most useful thing this paper can do is mark the boundaries of what the court actually decided.
DCF is not categorically prohibited. The court declined the government’s broadest position that an income approach can never apply in a Section 1060 allocation. It rejected this model on this record, not the method in principle.
Purchase price is not categorically irrelevant. The residual method allocates a real purchase price across asset classes. The lesson is that price must be allocated with evidence, not that price is ignored.
Eligible basis is not universally capped at bare construction cost. The court added developer profit and capitalized indirect costs above hard cost. A step-up above invoices is available when substantiated.
Development fees are not categorically excluded. The Oak Creek Development Fee was included and the Development Rights category was excluded in the same opinion. The difference was proof. A fee tied to documented development work and properly allocated survived, while a bundled category the taxpayers could not break down did not.
A 15 or 20 percent developer markup is not automatically available. Those figures were findings tied to specific comparable transactions. A different project needs its own market support, and the defensible number could be higher or lower.
Turn-key value is not categorically unavailable. The premium was denied here because the cost base already reflected amounts paid for the delivery of tested, integrated, operational facilities, and the taxpayers did not prove an increment beyond that. A taxpayer that can identify residual integration or completion risk not already paid for through the project contracts may support a premium.
The treatment of Section 1603 grant value does not mechanically resolve every Section 48 or 48E question. The circularity holding is about pulling the incentive into the basis that computes the incentive. It maps cleanly onto appraisal-driven basis, and it does not disturb ordinary cost-based basis where no credit value sits inside the cash flows.21
7. Implications for Sections 48 and 48E
The circularity problem is structural, and it is worth stating plainly where it does and does not arise. A governmental or tax-exempt owner constructing a project for its own account at documented arm’s-length cost generally does not face the same Section 1060 purchase-price-allocation problem presented in Alta Wind. However, it still must substantiate its costs, capitalize and allocate indirect costs correctly, identify nonqualifying property, and support any affiliated-party or bundled development charges. The circularity concern becomes most acute where fair-market-value analysis materially increases qualified basis above documented project cost. That may arise in sale-leasebacks, acquisitions of completed or development-stage projects, certain lease pass-through structures, and partnership transactions involving a taxable project sale or other asserted fair-market-value step-up.
For acquired projects, the first question is whether the transaction is an applicable asset acquisition under Section 1060. Section 1060 generally applies where assets constituting a trade or business are transferred and the buyer’s basis is determined wholly by reference to the consideration paid. It therefore does not apply merely because a renewable-energy project changes owners. When it does apply, the consideration must be allocated through the residual-method asset classes, and the taxpayer must establish the fair market value attributable to the qualifying tangible property within Class V, in which the grant-eligible tangible property at issue was classified.
The treatment of the Oak Creek Development Fee is a meaningful planning point for the sponsors Walker Blue serves. Development, engineering, procurement, and construction are routinely run through affiliated entities, and the case shows that a development fee tied to real, documented work and reliably allocated between eligible and ineligible property may support inclusion in the fair market value of eligible Class V property, notwithstanding a government characterization of the amount as mere developer profit. What the fee buys must be real, identifiable, and documented, and the allocation should be built in a cost-segregation study rather than asserted. Walker Blue expects insurers, tax credit buyers, and investors to scrutinize developer-profit assumptions and affiliated-developer margins more closely after Alta Wind. A well-documented fee record should therefore strengthen both examination defense and transaction diligence.
Cost-segregation studies deserve a specific caution because they cut both ways. KPMG’s reports carried weight in this case on the strength of their review depth and independent hours, and at the same time the taxpayers’ own study became the baseline that constrained unsupported departures in either direction. A study commissioned to support basis will be read against the taxpayer as readily as for it, which is an argument for scoping and documenting it to an audit standard from the outset.
Reporting consistency is an examination and diligence exposure in its own right. Property tax abatement filings, PILOT applications, insured-value schedules, GAAP purchase accounting, PPA pricing support, and the ITC basis workpapers all need to tell one story, because an examiner or a buyer’s diligence team will compare them, and a characterization made for one purpose can be turned against the taxpayer in another.
Section 6418 transferability does not eliminate the Alta Wind circularity concern.22 It creates an observable market for the credit, not for the underlying qualified property. Walker Blue would not support increasing eligible basis merely because a credit can be sold at an observable price. Using the transfer price of a credit to increase the basis that determines the amount of that same credit would risk reproducing the circularity the court rejected.
Finally, the broader diligence climate will shift. Walker Blue expects tax equity investors, credit buyers, and insurers to intensify their existing diligence concerning whether eligible basis is grounded in documented cost or depends materially on an appraisal. A cost-anchored, engineering-documented basis is easier for buyers, insurers, and investors to diligence, and more defensible.
8. Walker Blue’s Post-Alta Wind Methodology
Alta Wind validates the core of Walker Blue’s engineering-led approach, but it also establishes a higher documentation standard for acquired projects and material fair-market-value step-ups. In response, Walker Blue is formalizing two distinct eligible-basis workstreams.
Cost-Based Eligible Basis Study. For owner-constructed projects and arm’s-length EPC or design-build transactions, Walker Blue traces documented costs to the qualifying property, evaluates direct and indirect capitalization, allocates shared costs, identifies exclusions, and reconciles the resulting basis to the taxpayer’s accounting records and filing position.
Transaction Eligible Basis Study. For acquired projects, sale-leasebacks, and other transactions involving a material fair-market-value increment, Walker Blue adds transaction-history review, Section 1060 analysis, identification of Class VI and VII intangibles, contract-based turn-key-risk analysis, related-party fee review, and coordination with qualified appraisal, tax, and legal professionals.
Across both workstreams the through-line is the same. Every number in a Walker Blue basis study is meant to be traceable to a fact, a cost, a contract, or a comparable, and reconciled against every parallel representation the taxpayer has made. We do not rely on an internal financial model alone to support a claimed profit or premium. The analysis must be corroborated by contemporaneous market evidence, project-specific risks, governing contracts, and comparable transactions. In Alta Wind, the court credited DAI’s market-reflective developer-profit ranges and rejected the government expert’s CAPM-derived return because the model and its adjustments were not sufficiently supported by the evidentiary record or market practice.
9. Action Items for Developers and Investors
The practical goal is to build the examination file before an IRS information document request asks the taxpayer to reconstruct it. Walker Blue expects examiners to ask about purchase-price allocations, developer fees and profit, turn-key premiums, cost segregation, and indirect costs. The practical takeaways reduce to a short set of habits that should be in place before a project is placed in service, not reconstructed after a notice. Commission the cost-segregation study contemporaneously and scope it to an audit standard, with independent review and a clear eligible-versus-ineligible allocation, because that study is both the taxpayer’s best evidence and the baseline that will constrain later departures. The significance of the cost-segregation study was made clear by the court’s reliance on it for both the qualified property determination and the allocation of profit under the cost method. Preserve purchase price allocations and supporting documentation for every acquisition in a project’s history, not merely the most recent, since basis characterization travels with the asset through each transfer.
Document what any development fee or affiliated-party fee actually purchased, in identifiable services and real cost, so that a related-party payment survives the same factual scrutiny the Oak Creek Development Fee survived. Read the EPC, balance-of-plant, and equipment contracts for where turn-key and completion risk resides before an appraiser layers a premium on top of amounts that already embed it. Do not treat the credit itself as Class V property or use anticipated credit value, adders, or transfer proceeds as unsupported inputs that inflate the basis used to calculate that same credit. Any income-based approach must independently isolate the value of the qualifying tangible property and be corroborated by market evidence. And reconcile the ITC basis position against every parallel filing the taxpayer has made, from property tax and PILOT applications to insured-value schedules and GAAP purchase accounting, because an inconsistency in one becomes an examiner’s argument in another.
For anyone acquiring an operating or development-stage project, participating in a sale-leaseback or inverted-lease transaction, or relying on a fair-market-value step-up, the governing principle is simple. The record built now is the record defended later.
10. Conclusion
Basis is not simply the project’s price, nor is it necessarily limited to equipment invoices. It is a substantiated tax attribute built from the transaction, the physical property, the capitalization rules, and the evidence. Alta Wind on remand did not narrow that attribute so much as insist that it be proven. The taxpayers’ principal DCF valuation theory failed not because the law categorically prohibited an income approach, but because the taxpayers had not built the evidentiary record necessary to support the allocation it produced. For developers, investors, and the advisors who serve them, the instruction is to build eligible basis deliberately, document it contemporaneously, and reconcile it consistently, long before anyone asks to see it.
Notes
1. Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, No. 2027-1002, Order (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2026) (nonprecedential) (dismissing the proceeding under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) because the parties so agreed, with each side to bear its own costs, and issuing the order as the mandate).
2. Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, Nos. 13-402, 13-917, 13-935, 13-972, 14-47, 14-93, 14-174, 14-175, 17-997 (Fed. Cl. July 8, 2026) (reported trial opinion and order on remand) (Holte, J.), ECF No. 494.
3. Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, Nos. 13-402 et al., Order (Fed. Cl. July 27, 2026) (awarding plaintiffs $49,407,203.33 plus interest to the extent required by law, and reasonable costs under RCFC 54(d), on the parties’ Joint Status Report, ECF No. 495).
4. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (observing that discounted cash flow for Section 1060 valuations is not inherently defective, and that the record evidence in this case favored the cost approach).
5. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (directing the parties to begin with the grant-eligible costs in each KPMG cost-segregation report, exclude Development Rights, retain Interest During Construction and the Oak Creek Development Fee, and apply developer profit of fifteen percent for Alta I and twenty percent for Alta II through VI).
6. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (developer-profit findings and testimony of George Revock concerning Citibank’s use of the DAI Management Consultants appraisals in evaluating its acquisitions of Alta II through V).
7. Alta Wind I Owner Lessor v. United States, 897 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
8. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603, 123 Stat. 115, 364–66; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury, Energy Surpass $1 Billion Milestone in Recovery Act Awards for Clean Energy Projects (Sept. 22, 2009) (describing the program as providing cash assistance in place of tax credits and as jumpstarting private sector investment); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 1603 Program: Payments for Specified Energy Property in Lieu of Tax Credits (program overview) (describing the program as created to increase investment in domestic clean energy production and to reimburse eligible applicants for a portion of the cost of installing specified energy property).
9. ARRA § 1603(b)(1) (payment generally calculated as thirty percent of the basis of specified energy property described in Section 1603(d)(1) through (4)); see I.R.C. §§ 48, 48E.
10. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (factual background; Terra-Gen’s total investment in the Alta Wind facilities and the proportion represented by the buyout of the original developers).
11. ARRA § 1603(g)(4); see Alta Wind I, 897 F.3d at 1370.
12. Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 702 (2016), vacated and remanded, 897 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
13. I.R.C. § 1060; Treas. Reg. § 1.338-6(b); Alta Wind I, 897 F.3d at 1376.
14. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (factual background and procedural history; grant applications submitted, the amount Treasury awarded, the additional amount sought by plaintiffs, and the government’s counterclaim).
15. July 27, 2026 Order (table of fair market value, calculated grant, grant previously paid, and unpaid balance by facility and plaintiff); Joint Status Report, ECF No. 495 (total fair market value of $2,014,277,851.10 across Alta I through VI); Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, No. 2027-1002 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2026) (appeal docketed October 1, 2026). The roughly $495 million figure from the original proceedings ties to the final accounting after subtracting $59,949,966, which is one half of the $119,899,932 previously paid for Alta I and corresponds to the two added Alta I owner-lessors. That tie is Walker Blue’s reconciliation of the party lists and the judgment table and is not a reconciliation stated by the court.
16. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (testimony of KPMG audit partner Anthony Johnston concerning the scope of KPMG’s review, the hours devoted, the agreements and disbursements examined, and the limits of the eligibility analysis).
17. I.R.C. § 263A(f); July 8, 2026 trial opinion (treatment of Interest During Construction as a capitalizable indirect cost).
18. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (Oak Creek Development Fee; pro rata allocation between eligible and ineligible property; the government expert’s characterization of the fee as a success fee for the development of intangible assets).
19. Miami Valley Broad. Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 677, 680 (Ct. Cl. 1974), adopted in Alta Wind I, 897 F.3d at 1377.
20. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (project-specific developer-profit ranges in the DAI appraisals; rejection of the government expert’s capital-asset-pricing-model derivation).
21. July 8, 2026 trial opinion (discussion of the circularity created by using anticipated grant value to increase the basis that determines the grant); Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, 166 Fed. Cl. 386, 409, 413 (2023); see Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c).
22. I.R.C. § 6418.
For questions on applying this framework to a specific transaction structure, contact the Walker Blue tax team.
Walker Blue LLC is an engineering-led tax advisory firm specializing in clean energy tax incentives. This white paper is general information and is not tax advice for any specific taxpayer or transaction. Figures and holdings described in this paper are drawn from the Court of Federal Claims’ July 8, 2026 trial opinion and July 27, 2026 judgment, the Federal Circuit’s October 7, 2026 dismissal order, and the Federal Circuit’s 2018 remand opinion. The dismissal was nonprecedential and did not constitute appellate endorsement of the trial court’s valuation methodology.
